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THE PROBLEM OF POLICE BRUTALITY
Violent force has been used in this country by many factions
to accomplish their goals. But never before has the cry, "police
brutality," been heard so often in protest of the employment of
violent force by the police to preserve law and order. Cries of
"police brutality" have become all too common for the legal com-
munity to remain inactive.
The problem of police brutality must be viewed with reference
to the function of the police and the laws that govern their use of
force. The police are charged with the duty of upholding the law
and, in an effort to do so, have the authority to arrest violators of
law. The authority to arrest necessarily carries with it the privilege
to use that force which is reasonably necessary to effect arrests or
to repel resistance to an arrest.1 The type of situation that an of-
ficer is in when he uses force, that is, arresting a felon or misde-
meanant, apprehending a fleeing felon, preventing crime or repelling
an attack, is determinative of the amount of force that is permitted.
This comment discusses the use and abuse of permissible force.
Particularly, this comment is concerned with the victim's remedies
for, and society's control of, the use of unreasonable force by the
police.
PERMISSIBLE FORCE
Deadly Force
In most states the use of deadly force by a police officer is
restricted to situations where such force is reasonably necessary for
the officer's self-defense, to overcome resistance to an arrest or to
halt a fleeing felon.2 The unlawful use of deadly force renders the
police officer liable, both criminally and civilly.
Recently, the wisdom of the above rules has been seriously
challenged. Much of the discontent with the present law is due to
the fact that the social rationale once used to support the rules is
no longer applicable, because the common law distinctions between
felonies and misdemeanors are no longer valid. For example, at
I Bowers, Nature of the Problem of Police Brutality, 14 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV.
601 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Bowers].
2 p. TAPPAN, CRimE, JUSTICE AND CORRECTION 285 (1960) [hereinafter cited as
P. TAPPAN)]. But, the use of deadly force to arrest or apprehend a fleeing misdemeanant
is never allowed. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 980 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited
as R. PERKINS].
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common law, the commission of a felony worked an automatic for-feiture of the felon's life.' So, the use of deadly force to apprehend
a felon was permissible. Today, since few felonies are punishable bydeath, a man does not forfeit his life by the mere perpetration of afelony; hence deadly force can no longer be justified by the above
rationale. Furthermore, scientific research has developed non-lethal
methods of apprehension, such as mace, tear gas and tranquilizers,
which greatly decrease the need for deadly force. Although the use
of such devices often results in the cry of "police brutality," one
cannot seriously contend that such devices are more brutal than
death itself.
Allowing a policeman to use deadly force to apprehend a felon
when he believes that it is reasonably necessary to do so is highlyquestionable. In some situations, particularly where the felon hastaken a life, the question is not so difficult. But, where the particularfelony is a property crime or the mere possession of marijuana, thequestion is difficult indeed. 4 The morality of taking a life for the
enforcement of property rights has been challenged by many author-ities. One commentator feels that this rule is "dangerously liberal"
and encourages "official slaughter." 5 This argument gains credence
when one considers that in the defense of property, the use of deadlyforce is never authorized.6 Obviously, the conclusion follows thatproperty is not as valuable as human life.
Two arguments are lodged against the use of deadly force ingeneral. First, the use of deadly force creates a substantial risk toinnocent bystanders. 7 Second, many authorities have pointed to in-
3 R. PERKINS, supra note 2, at 985.
4 Comment, Kill or be Killed: Use of Deadly Force in the Riot Situation, 56CALIr. L. REV. 829 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Kill or be Killed].5 P. TAPPAN, supra note 2, at 286. "A preliminary study of thirty police homicides
• .. indicated that seven of the victims had committed either no crimes at all or onlymisdemeanors. In only thirteen cases did the officer see the victim commit a felonybefore killing him, despite the fact that the law permits a policeman to use hisweapon only to protect his own or a citizen's life from immediate danger or to
apprehend a person known to have committed a felony.
"Ten of the thirty victims were originally apprehended by the officer for mis-demeanors, on vague suspicion, or for other non criminal reasons. When they fled-without attacking the officer-they were shot down. Their deaths were nothing moreor less than murders, made justifiable by the decision of a coroner's jury or non-culpable by a grand jury's decision not to indict." E. CRAY, THE BIG BLUE LINE157 (1967) [hereinafter cited as E. CRAY].
6 R. PERKINS, supra note 2, at 1026.
7 INSTITUTE OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, CRIMINAL LAW AND TE CoN-
STITUTION 397 (1968).
More than one-hundred people were injured during the People's Park incident inBerkeley, California. San Francisco Chronicle, May 16, 1969, at 1, col. 8. The policeused tear gas and bird shot to control the crowds. Id. at 4, col. 5. Listed among thenumber hospitalized were twenty-seven demonstrators and two newsmen with gunshot
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appropriate police action, particularly the use of deadly force, as a
cause of many of our civil disorders and racial violence.
8 In this
day of overcrowded conditions, the weight of these arguments can-
not be ignored.
The Use of Deadly Force in Self-Defense
Most problems relating to the use of deadly force arise in the
self-defense situation. 9 Any person, including a police officer, may
use deadly force to repel a deadly attack. 10 This right obtains
whether the person making an attack is a felon or a misdemean-
ant." The problem which arises from the policeman's use of deadly
force in self-defense is that the police may "take advantage of this
right to a degree that would not be tolerated from the civilian."'
2
Of course, the nature of police work requires and explains some of
this tolerance.' This in itself justifies the policeman's use of more
force than would be allowed to the private person.
Permissible Force in California
In California permissible force is a statutory matter.
14 When
making an arrest, a police officer may use reasonable force to re-
strain, to apprehend or to overcome an individual's resistance to an
arrest. He may use deadly force to apprehend or effect the arrest of
wounds. In contrast to these figures, only six officers were hospitalized, and none of
them had gunshot wounds. Id. at 6, col. 4.
The same problem was present in the Detroit riots during the summer of 1967.
"No deaths occurred during the first day of the rioting, but they mounted in the next
several days as the use of firearms increased." Kill or be Killed, supra note 4, at 832.
8 INSTITUTE OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 7, at 391.
"The police themselves, . . . are frequently responsible for the incidents which salt
the wound of social discontent." E. CRAY, supra note 5, at 9.
9 R. PERKINS, supra note 2, at 997.
10 People v. Mallicoat, 27 Cal. App. 355, 149 P. 1000 (1915). Furthermore, even
the jurisdictions that adhere to the "retreat rule" make a special exception for a police
officer and hold that an officer need not retreat before he can use deadly force to repel
a deadly attack made by a person he is lawfully arresting. R. PERKINS, supra note 2,
at 1009.
11 People v. Hardwick, 204 'Cal. 582, 269 P. 427 (1928).
12 p. TAPPAI , supra note 2, at 285.
13 Id. Police work is very dangerous and serves an important function in the
society. Police are practically always armed and are usually near crime. Furthermore,
assaults on police officers are quite common. So, no one can doubt that a police officer
needs a greater degree of tolerance in this respect than does a private person.
14 CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 835-35a (West Supp. 1968).
Section 835 provides that "[aln arrest is made by an actual restraint of the per-
son, or by submission to the custody of an officer. The person arrested may be sub-
jected to such restraint as is reasonable for his arrest and detention."
Section 835a provides that "Any peace officer who has reasonable cause to believe
that the person to be arrested has committed a public offense may use reasonable force
to effect the arrest, to prevent escape or overcome resistance.
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a felon. But, in any situation: Felony, misdemeanor or otherwise, he
may use deadly force to repel a deadly attack. To this end an officer
may even take a life.1"
REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO THE VICTIM OF A POLICE ASSAULT
Generally
Charges of police brutality may be dealt with in several ways.
Some European countries have established the institution of om-
budsman, a liaison between police and citizens to deal with this and
other problems of governmental activity. 6 This situation has been
quite successful in controlling the abuse of police discretion." Des-
pite its success, apparently no American jurisdiction has adopted
the ombudsman approach to control police brutality.' 8
Some American jurisdictions have adopted the concept of
police review boards to deal with the problem of police brutality and
with other problems. 9 Comprised of citizens from the community,
these boards hear and act on complaints arising from police ac-
tivities. The action that a board may take to discipline the offending
officer varies in accordance with the authority vested in it. More-
over, such authority usually includes the power to suspend or de-
mote the offending officer. Generally, the law enforcement com-
munity does not approve of police review boards and considers
them an encroachment upon the traditional means of internal dis-
cipline."0
"A peace officer who makes or attempts to make an arrest need not retreat ordesist from his efforts by reason of the resistance or threatened resistance of the per-
son being arrested; nor shall such officer be deemed an aggressor or lose his right to
self-defense by the use of reasonable force to effect the arrest or to prevent escape or
to overcome resistance."
15 People v. Hardwick, 204 Cal. 582, 269 P. 427 (1928).16 For example, Sweden and Denmark have long recognized the institution of
ombudsman.
The ombudsman acts as a liaison between the community and its government. Itis charged with the responsibility of protecting citizens from abusive governmental
practices. It has no authority to award damages. Its sole function is to bring about
reforms. E. CRAY, supra note 5, at 223-24.
17 T. AARON, CONTROL OF POLICE DISCRETION; THE DANISH EXPERIENCE (1966).
18 E. CRAY, supra note 5, at 223.
19 Two such jurisdictions are Pennsylvania and Michigan.
20 Police review boards have been sharply attacked on a variety of charges,
"[Rianging from unsubtle hints of a Communist conspiracy to allegations that they
would destroy morale on the force." E. CRAY, supra note 5, at 218.
The Internation Association of Police Chiefs has taken a strong stand against
these boards, attributing their increase in popularity to the increased interest in civil
rights. Police Review Boards, 31 T-E POLICE 'CHsur 12 (Feb. 1964).
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Civil Remedies in California
In the absence of police review boards and other similar rem-
edies the citizen's sole form of redress is to the courts in a civil or
criminal action. This is the case in California, as there are no police
review boards.2" The basic tort remedy that can be used in Cal-
ifornia for redress of a police attack is an action for assault and bat-
tery.
The civil law of assault and battery is derived from the general
personal right to be free from bodily restraint or harm, as outlined
in the California Civil Code section 43.22 Under this section the
courts usually assume that the Penal Code provisions for assault
and battery apply, along with their judicial interpretations." An
assault is established by showing that the defendant's conduct led
the plaintiff to a reasonable apprehension of bodily harm.
24 A
battery is established by showing that the defendant's violence or
willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the plaintiff's rights proxi-
mately caused the plaintiff's injuries.2" The intent of the defendant
is a relevant issue only when the injury arises from a lawful act. If
the injury arises from an unlawful act, the defendant's intent is
immaterial,2 6 because such intent is inferred from the unlawful
conduct.2"
Additionally, the courts allow exemplary damages in cases
where victims have sustained injuries from an assault with a deadly
weapon where there was no provocation on the victim's part.
2
" The
policy for this rule is to discourage the indiscriminate use of deadly
weapons.
California Government Code section 820 provides that a public
employee is liable in damages to one injured by his act or omission
in the same manner as a private person.29 The cases consistently
21 B. Coox, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN CALIFORNIA 102 (1967) thereinafter cited
as B. CooK].
This situation is not apt to change in the near future because in 1965 the Legis-
lature killed a bill that would have authorized police review hoards. Id.
22 CAL. CIV. CODE § 43 (West 1954) provides: "Besides the personal rights men-
tioned or recognized in the Government Code, every person has, subject to the
qualifications and restrictions provided by law, the right of protection from bodily
restraint or harm ....
2 Fraguglia v. Sala, 17 Cal. App. 2d 738, 62 P.2d 783 (1936).
24 Lopez v. Surchia, 112 Cal. App. 2d 314, 246 P.2d 111 (1952).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Herman v. Glasscock, 68 Cal. App. 2d 98, 155 P.2d 912 (1945).
29 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 820 (West 1966).
[Vol. 10
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hold that an officer is liable under this section for injuries that are
caused by his use of unreasonable force in making an arrest.30
Problems of the Civil Remedy
The use of the tort sanction to control police brutality is quite
rare and apparently ineffective as a deterrent.3' Since civil suits areinstituted by the victims of police assaults, and since the lack of
suits may indicate a general apathy on their part, the victims mustbear some of the blame for this situation. But some of their reluc-tance to pursue the tort remedy can be explained by considering the
various reasons that might lead a citizen to believe that it would beto his advantage to forego litigation. In some instances the fear of
subsequent police harassment may possibly discourage victims of
police assaults from litigation.32
Furthermore, because complaints of police brutality usually
arise from the arrest situation, the police often have the upper handin any subsequent negotiations with the victim.3 Accordingly, thedecision whether to prosecute the defendant is made at the discre-
30 Scruggs v. Haynes, 252 Cal. App. 2d 656, 60 Cal. Rptr. 355 (1967).31 W. LAFAVE, ARREST, THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 413(1965) [hereinafter cited as W. LAFAVE]. Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations
of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REV. 493 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Foote].32 W. LAFAvE, supra note 31, at 424.
Fear that the police "[W]ill retaliate with new charges or that the district attor-ney will press charges stemming from the original arrest" also deters many would-be
complainants from ever filing charges. Further, "[T]he police discourage the filing ofcomplaints by arresting would-be complainants or by prosecuting them for filing falsereports with the police department. This quickly discourages complaints." E. CRAY,
supra note 5, at 176.
In Washington, D.C., during 1962 "40 percent of those who reported allegedpolice misconduct were themselves haled into court to face misdemeanor charges offiling a false report with the police." Id. at 179.
33 "Many defendants will agree not to press charges against an offending officerin exchange for the privilege of copping a plea-pleading guilty to lesser charges and
receiving lighter jail or prison sentences." Id. at 11.
Criminal charges are often filed against the victim of a police assault for "obstruc-tion of justice" type offenses. An example of such a charge is the case of RussellBroughton, who witnessed a police attack on a Negro youth. Upon inquiring as to thereason for the attack, he was arrested. Broughton's attorney, after conferring with thePolice Court Judge advised Broughton that if he signed a release "[Tlhe judge woulddismiss the charge placed against him.
". . . According to the arresting officer, Broughton had willfully and unlawfullyinterfered in the arresting officer's attempt to carry out his duties" by allegedly stating,
"I would like to know why all this police brutality." Broughton, on the other handclaimed that he said only, "I was kind of wondering why you are manhandling this
boy."
"Broughton was charged with interfering with a police officer simply because-asthe officer put it-he failed to move on when the officer told him to do so. Short of athreatened riot-and there was no unruly crowd watching the arrest-the police officerhad no right to order Broughton to move on." E. CRAY, supra note 5, at 23-24.
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tion of the district attorney,84 subject to influence by the police.
Under such circumstances a victim of police brutality may be quite
reluctant to pursue his civil remedy. For example, the police may
persuade the victim to agree to a compromise whereby the police
agree to "talk to the district attorney" if the victim will withdraw
his complaint. 5
Many factors may contribute to the motivations of the victim
and the police to make such a compromise. The most obvious is the
desire of the victim to avoid incarceration and the imposition of a
criminal record. 6 On the other hand, the police have their reputa-
tion to protect and do not want the bad publicity that usually arises
from a tort case against a policeman.87 Hence, both parties stand to
gain considerably by such a compromise.
To prevail in a civil case, the plaintiff-victim must establish his
case by a preponderance of the evidence. In application, this
burden of proof is often insurmountable because the plaintiff-victim
often must prove his case to a jury that is likely to be more sym-
pathetic towards the defendant-policeman than to one who appears
to them to be a plaintiff-criminal. ' 8 Further, if the victim is not a
84 CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 737, 807 (West 1956).
85 Considering the working relationship of the police and the district attorney, it
is very likely that the police have some say in the disposition of charges filed against
the victim of a police assault. See note 33 supra, and accompanying text.
86 "Frequently, too, those who might complain of deprivation of one or another
of their civil liberties by the police must face criminal charges of which they are 
guilty.
If they are at all prison-wise, they know matters will go much more smoothly 
and
the sentence will be much less harsh if they do not complain. First offenders who 
do
make complaints must pursue those complaints from behind bars-no easy task. 
They
generally prefer to devote themselves to appeals of the criminal charges on 
which
they were convicted, leaving the secondary malpractice matters as unimportant 
at the
moment.
"Consequently, the number of formal complaints is not large, and the full 
extent
of police malpractice is only hinted. Occasional figures compiled from court 
records
indicate that there is far more malpractice than formal complaints represent." 
E. CRAY,
supra note 5, at 180.
87 W. LAFAVE, supra note 31, at 425.
Another interesting phenomenon comes into play here which offers further 
in-
centive to withdraw a complaint, thus preventing a civil suit from ever arising. 
Police
associations formed by the officers themselves often maintain a fund for the 
purpose
of settling claims lodged against their members. An adequate out-of-court 
settlement
can usually be paid by such a fund and the cost is quite low for the individual 
officers
in the association. This fact further defeats the deterrent effect of a civil suit 
against
a police officer. This, coupled with the facts that the courts themselves 
favor out-of-
court settlements in such situations, and that they are necessary in a large 
percentage
of the cases due to the overcrowded court dockets, provides a strong inducement 
to
accept the out-of-court settlement. Id. at 424-25.
88 W. LaFave, supra note 31, at 413.
It has been pointed out that there is an "[Ujnwilingness of juries to believe the
word of the average citizen when a policeman contradicts him," Kill or be 
Killed,
supra nlot 4, at 856.
[Vol. 10
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"respectable citizen,"'a9 the jury is quite likely to find that he did
not suffer any substantial damage as a result of the particular police
action.40
Further difficulties attributable to certain police practices arise
in meeting the burden of proof. The secrecy of police interrogations
and the fact that the victims of police assaults are often isolated at
the time of an assault, renders it difficult to sustain any amount
of proof of a police assault.4 Because of this, the victim of a police
assault rarely has witnesses to substantiate his claim; if he does,
they will rarely speak out because of fear of retaliation; 42 whereas
the police officer usually has numerous fellow officers who "saw it
all."143 Moreover, the court and/or jury is more apt to believe the
police when they give their account of the alleged assault or the
perennial "accidental fall down the station house stairs" which
occurred while "resisting arrest" and which accounted for the vic-
tim's bruises or hospitalization. 4 Furthermore, some police have
employed such tactics as blinding lights, the water cure and pound-
ing victims with soft objects such as sand filled socks and rubber
hoses to avoid leaving marks on their victims.45 Hence, even in a
blatant case of police brutality, there may be little evidence, other
than his own testimony, that a victim can offer to prove physical
abuse at the hands of the police.
The courts themselves are not without blame for the scarcity
of cases against the police involving use of unreasonable force and
the general inadequacy of the remedy as a means to control police
activity. As already noted, out of court settlements are encouraged
by the courts.46 Further, certain judicial attitudes evidence a judicial
disinclination to intervene on behalf of a citizen in the area of police
activity.47 This disfavor, combined with the problems above, make a
person's right to sue and prosecute the police a "consistently poor
"In addition, juries are unlikely to grant a verdict to a 'criminal type.' " Id. at 858.
See also, Foote, supra note 31, at 504-06.
39 "Yet it is the poor and the friendless who suffer the most at the hands of the
police." E. CRAY, supra at note 5, at 175. See also, Foote, supra note 31, at 500.
40 W. LAFAVE, supra note 31, at 423. See also, Kill or be Killed, supra note 4, at
858.
41 p. TAPPAN, supra note 2, at 292.
42 "Most such assaults on the streets or in the back seat of police cars are un-
observed. Rare is the eyewitness . . . who doesn't fear retaliation because he spoke
out; rarer still is the witness . . . who is merely an observer, unimplicated in the
arrest or assault: . . . ." E. CRAY, supra note 5, at 146.
43 Id. at 25. See also, P. TAPPAN, supra note 2, at 292.
44 P. TAPPAN, supra note 2, at 285. See also, E. CRAY, supra note 5, at 146.
45 P. TAPPAN, supra note 2, at 289.
46 Supra note 35.
47 "In this instance it has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the
wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to
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remedy.148 Therefore, the unlawful practices of the police, such as
the use of unreasonable force, continue to "'pay-off' in terms of
results and are pursued with impunity."4
No matter what the cause, the scarcity of civil suits definitely
generates an apathy towards the tort remedy on the part of the
police.50 This fact indicates that the tort remedy has little deterrent
value relative to the use of unreasonable force by the police.5
Governmental Immunity
Although a policeman may be civilly liable for a particular
tort, it does not necessarily follow that his governmental employer
will also be liable.52 California Government Code section 815 pro-
vides that, in the absence of another statute which imposes liability,
the public entity is not liable for an injury caused by a public
employee.53 Where liability is imposed on the public entity by an-
other statute, it is subject to the same defenses that are available
to a private person.54
The California Codes are abundant with sections that impose
liability on a public entity in certain limited situations. California
Government Code section 815.2 imposes liability on the public
entity for an injury proximately caused by a public employee while
acting within the scope of his employment.55 However, by operation
of this section, if the offending officer is immune from liability, for
example, by operation of the discretionary immunity doctrine, 6 then
the public entity cannot be sued either." Conversely, if the police
officer is not immune from liability, then neither is the public en-
tity.5"
the constant threat of retaliation." Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.
1949). See, White v. Towers, 37 Cal. 2d 727, 235 P.2d 209 (1951) ; Odinetz v. Budds,
315 Mich. 512, 24 N.W.2d 193 (1946).
48 p. TAPPAN, supra note 2, at 288.
49 Id.
50 W. LAFAVE, supra note 31, at 413.
51 Id. Foote, supra note 31, at 493.
52 Most American jurisdictions allow for the immunity of the public entity from
liability growing out of police law enforcement activities. R. Jones & W. Mathes,
Toward a "Scope of Official Duty" Immunity for Police Officers in Damage Actions,
53 GEO. L.J. 889, 890 (1965).
53 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 815 (West 1966).
54 Id.
55 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 815.2 (West 1966).
56 See text accompanying notes 114-15 infra.
57 One author points out that in order for the tort remedy to be effective in pre-
venting and controlling police brutality, governmental liability must be established.
Foote, supra note 31, at 514.
58 Scruggs v. Haynes, 252 Cal. App. 2d 256, 60 Cal. Rptr. 355 (1967). See Jones
v. City of Los Angeles, 215 Cal. App. 2d 155, 30 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1963).
[Vol. 10
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Section 815.2 is particularly suited to deal with claims of police
brutality arising from the riot situation where crowd control is often
accomplished by faceless, badgeless blue waves.59 In an action
under this section the victim does not have to identify the offending
officer whose tortious conduct is the basis for the public entity's
liability. The victim need only show that he was injured by a police
officer, acting in the scope of his employment, in a way that would
render him personally liable. ° The only issue in such a case would
be that of the reasonableness of the force used under the circum-
stances. That is a jury question.
Where a public entity is immune from suit by operation of
section 815, it may still have to satisfy a judgment entered against
one of its police officers. California Government Code section 825
provides that if a public employee requests the public entity to
defend him in an action for an injury arising from his employment
and the entity complies, then the entity is compelled to "pay anyjudgment based thereon."'" However, for reasons hereinafter dis-
cussed, the public entity is exempt from paying any exemplary
damages awarded the plaintiff.62 On the one hand, this statute
benefits the police officer in that he does not have to pay a judgment
entered against him.6" However, this section tends to subvert one
59 The Alameda County Grand Jury, in its report on the People's Park incident,
noted that many of the officers involved in controlling the demonstrators were un-identifiable at the time of the riot. San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 8, 1969, at 12, col. 8.Logically, this indicates that the officers were badgeless. The Grand Jury recommended
that officers be identifiable at all times during a riot. Id.
At Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where three hundred anti-war demon-
strators picketed an on-campus laboratory, they were dispersed by two-hundred hel-
meted police, wearing no identification. Id., Nov. 6, 1969, at 13, col. 4.
60 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815.2 (West 1966), Legislative Committee Comment.
61 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 825 (West 1966).
This section is effective only when the public entity has tendered defense or has
agreed to pay any judgment that results from the action or claim. Id., Legislative
Committee Comment.
62 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 825 (West 1966). See Salinas v. Souza & McCue Construc-
tion Co., 66 Cal. 2d 217, 424 P.2d 921, 57 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1967); Nellis, California
Governmental Tort Liability and the Collateral Source Rule, 9 SANTA 'CLARA LAW.
227 (1969).
63 It should be noted that "[Slection 995 of the Government Code makes it
mandatory upon the city attorney to represent a policeman upon request in a civil
action arising out of the scope of his employment" unless the public entity can law-fully refuse to assert a defense as provided "under the provisions of sections 995.2 or995.4." Sinclair v. Arnebergh, 224 Cal. App. 2d 595, 598, 36 Cal. Rptr. 810, 811 (1964).
See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 995.2, 995.4 (West 1966).
So, in most cases the police officer need not "[Flace any requirement that he
assume the financial and mental burden of defending his official conduct in a personal
suit against him." Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 797, 447 P.2d 352, 359, 73 Cal.Rptr. 240, 247 (1968). However, this must have some bearing on the lack of deterrent
value discerned in the tort remedy.
1969]
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purpose of a civil action, to wit: The deterrence of unsocial be-
havior, that is, the use of unreasonable force by a police officer. The
police officer, not subject to pecuniary loss via a civil judgment
against him, apparently suffers only the consequence of losing his
job. 4 On the other hand, this section benefits the plaintiff who has
been awarded a judgment against a police officer in that it almost
guarantees him that he will receive some compensation."5 So, even
where the public entity is immune from suit, 0 it is still indirectly
responsible in that it has to pay the judgment.
Sections 815.2 and 825 are subject to one important qualifica-
tion. California Government Code section 818 provides that a public
entity never has to pay the exemplary damages awarded against
one of its employees under section 3294 of the California Civil
Code.67 This section is quite fair in that it is the logical extension of
the well established legal principle that an employer is not respon-
sible for the malicious acts of his employees. 8 Because exemplary
damages are awarded by way of punishment for malicious conduct,
with the hope of discouraging it, if the public entity was compelled
to pay them it would be answering for the criminal acts of its police
officers. 9
In summary, a person can sue the public entity for the tortious
activities of its police officers committed while acting in the scope of
their employment. To prevail, the plaintiff must show that the police
64 However, the threat of losing one's job does not appear to be a formidable
one, particularly in situations where the public entity tenders defense. A public entity
may refuse to defend an officer when it determines that actions in question were not
within the scope of his employment. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 995.2 (West 1966). So, it is
doubtful that "scope of employment" is an issue in many cases. If it is an issue, the
defense is probably conducted pursuant to an agreement as provided for in section
825. So, the public entity's main line of defense is the reasonableness of the officer's
conduct. By defending an officer on this basis, the public entity logically excludes
disciplining an officer on the basis of unreasonable conduct. This would lead one to
the conclusion that the officer's job is not in jeopardy.
65 This guarantee is quite costly to the plaintiff in that he has to "[Ble prepared
to pay out, in advance, money for depositions, jury fees, investigators' costs and court
filing fees. . . .Few victims of police malpractice can afford such costs ...
"In the meantime, the defendant oflicers can count on free legal service from the
city attorney . . . necessary costs paid out of the city treasury, and the invaluable
benefits of the department's (that is, fellow officers') investigations." E. CRAY, supra
note 5, at 211.
66 For example, application of CAL. Gov'T CODE § 844.6 (West 1966) provides,
in part, that a public entity is not liable for injuries to any prisoner.
67 'CAL. Gov'T CODE § 818 (West 1966). CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3294 (West 1966)
provides for the awarding of exemplary and punitive damages "where the defendant
has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied . .. ."
08 R. PERKINS, supra note 2, at 639. P. 'MECHEM, OUTLnES OF THE LAW OF
AcENCY § 407 (4th ed. 1952).
69 Salinas v. Souza & McCue Construction Co., 66 Cal. 2d 217, 228, 424 P.2d
921, 926, 37 Cal. Rptr. 337, 342 (1967).
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officer is, in fact, liable, and that there is no statutory provision that
exempts the public entity from liability in the specific situation.
Criminal Liability in California
In addition to the civil remedies discussed above, the victim
of a police assault may file charges against the offending officer for
criminal assault and battery. However, the actual proceeding must
be commenced by the district attorney, at his discretion, by con-
curring with the written complaint of the complainant.70 So, once
the charges are filed, the aggrieved citizen takes no further part in
the disposition of the case, save his role as witness. Because theproceeding is against the officer as a citizen, he may assert any
defense that is available to other citizens, that is, public authority,71
self-defense, 72 defense of others, 73 and prevention of crime.7 1
Of particular importance here are California Penal Code sec-
tions 240, 242 and 245. Section 240 defines an assault as an at-
tempted battery.75 Section 242 defines a battery as the unlaw-
ful use of force on another person. 76  Section 245 recognizes
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.77 The latter requires ex-
planation, in that convictions for assault with a deadly weapon are
not restricted to cases where a deadly weapon, per se, was used.
Section 245 creates two separate offenses: assault with a deadly
weapon and assault by means likely to produce great bodily harm. 78
Yet, in spite of the fact that a deadly weapon per se is not used,
convictions of police officers under section 245 are minimal.
70 See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
71 R. PERKINS, supra note 2, at 978.
72 Id. at 995.
73 Id. at 1021.
74 Id. at 990.
75 CAL. PEN. CODE § 240 (West 1955). "An assault is an unlawful attempt,
coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another."76 Id. § 242 "A battery is the willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon
the person of another."
77 Id. § 245 "Every person who commits an assault upon the person of another
with a deadly weapon or instrument or by means of force likely to produce great
bodily harm is punishable .... "
One should note that in a prosecution under this section, the prosecutor need
not prove a specific intent to commit an assault with a deadly weapon to make his
case. People v. Wright, 258 Cal. App. 2d 762, 765, 66 Cal. Rptr. 95, 98 (1968).78 Gonns v. United States, 231 F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1956).
In California, various weapons presently used by the police have been classified
as deadly weapons. A pistol used in that capacity is a deadly weapon. People v.Pearson, 150 Cal. App. 2d 811, 311 P.2d 142 (1957). A police officer's billy club and
a pistol used as a club in an attack on an officer are deadly weapons. People v. Cross-land, 111 Cal. App. 2d 831, 245 P.2d 380 (1952). A blackjack used to knock a personto the ground is also a deadly weapon. People v. Duncan, 72 Cal. App. 2d 423, 164P.2d 665 (1945). Or, the offense may be committed by beating with hand or fist,kicking, choking or "other comparable means." Gonns v. United States, supra.
1969]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER [Vol. 10
Penal Code section 149 provides that an assault or a beating
administered by a police officer without lawful necessity is a crime.7"
Enacted in 1872 and amended to alter the punishment provisions,
this statute would appear to have an influential effect on the control
of police brutality. But its infrequent use is illustrative of the fact
that this is not the case.8°
Problems of the Criminal Remedy
The four sections of the California Penal Code discussed above,
numbers 149, 240, 242 and 245, are particularly relevant to the
problem of police brutality since they make the remedy of criminal
prosecution available to the victim who has been assailed in ac-
cordance with their provisions. Although police activity often en-
compasses various elements of the crimes mentioned above, the
cases against police officers under these sections are minimal.8
This situation casts serious doubt on the role that criminal prosecu-
tion has in controlling police activity. Perhaps it is indicative of the
general ineffectiveness of the Penal Code as a citizen's remedy for
police assault.82
As noted above, once the complaining citizen files his com-
plaint, the course of the proceedings against a police officer is deter-
mined by the district attorney.8" This creates an awkward situation
in that "policemen and prosecutors do not punish themselves."84
79 CAL. PEN. CODE § 149 (West Supp. 1968). "Every public officer who, under
color of authority, without lawful necessity, assaults or beats any person, is pun-
ishable ......
80 Section 149 has been cited only four times since 1947: In re Riddle, 57 Cal. 2d
848, 852, 372 P.2d 304, 305, 22 Cal. Rptr. 472, 473 (1962) (dictum) ; People v. Rhone,
267 Cal. App. 2d 652, 656, 73 Cal. Rptr. 463, 465 (1968) (refusal to hear evidence
relative to section 149 as it was presented by way of a hypothetical) ; Ne Casek v.
City of Los Angeles, 233 Cal. App. 2d 131, 137, 43 Cal. Rptr. 294, 298 (1965) (dic-
tum) ; and People v. Lantz, 120 Cal. App. 2d 787, 792, 262 P.2d 19, 22 (1953) (deny-
ing a section 149 instruction).
81 For instance, not one criminal action was commenced against a policeman in
all of Los Angeles County from 1950 to 1967. B. CooK, supra note 21, at 103. "[S]tate
criminal prosecutions against offending officers are rare, and convictions rarer still."
E. CRAY, supra note 5, at 211. In a multi-state study, "[N]o instance of criminal
prosecution against a police officer was noted, and police did not voice any concern
over the threat of criminal prosecution." W. LAFAvE, supra note 31, at 426. Perhaps
the lack of concern was caused by the lack of prosecutions? No matter how one
resolves this question, the fact remains that the citizen's remedy of prosecution does
little, if anything, to control police brutality. Foote, supra note 31, at 493.
82 Apparently the inadequacies of this remedy have been experienced throughout
the world. W. LAFAvE, supra note 31, at 426 n.73, citing Commission on Human
Rights, Study on the Right of Everyone to Be Free From Arbitrary Arrest, Deten-
tion and Exile, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/813, at 209 (1961).
83 Supra note 34.
84 Foote, supra note 31, at 493.
"I should like to have brought to my attention any such case where a prosecution
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But, this is precisely the predicament that the police and the district
attorney are in when a case is prosecuted by information. Further-
more, the process of prosecution by information raises a "quasi-
conflict-of-interest" problem in that most of the time the police and
the district attorney are allied in the battle against crime. Thedistrict attorney depends upon the police for evidence to make a
case against a criminal.85 If the district attorney partook in frequentprosecutions of police officers on charges of brutality, animosity
could certainly develop. This would tend to break down the working
relationship between the two government departments. Hence, both
parties stand to benefit if the cases of police brutality are few. The
scarcity of cases on this matter lends support to this contention.
In summary, the citizen's resort to the courts to impose crim-
inal liability on the police apparently offers little help in controlling
police brutality or in aiding him in his dealings with the police.
Prisoners, a Special Situation
Often the cry of "police brutality" echoes off the prison walls.Rightfully so, as prisoners are not without rights under the law. A
conviction and sentence does not work a forfeiture of a man's right
to be protected by the law."6 A prison guard, like a police officer, is
subject to the same criminal and civil sanctions as any other citizen.
Furthermore, California has several statutes which purport to strictly
regulate and control the use of force in the prisons. Outlining sev-
eral special offenses that are similar to assault and battery, these
statutes apply to those who have prisoners in their custody.
California Penal Code section 2650 provides that any injury
to the person of a prisoner that is not authorized by law is punish-
able in the same manner as if the person were not a prisoner.87
This section provides a sanction against anyone who injures a
prisoner, and is the logical extension of a guard's duty to protect
prisoners in his custody. Hence, if a prison guard unlawfully beats
a prisoner, he will be criminally liable under the appropriate section
of the Penal Code by operation of section 2650.
has been successful, or even where a prosecution has been instituted. It is absurd to
suggest that any district attorney, or superior officer, is going to take criminal action
against one of his subordinates. . . ." White v. Towers, 37 Cal. 2d 727, 737, 235 P.2d
209, 215-16 (1951) (dissenting opinion).85 "The most serious problems with regard to criminal actions are the reluctance
both of the district attorney to prosecute actions against members of a police depart-
ment with which he must work in daily close cooperation, and of the police to testify
against each other." Kill or be Killed, supra note 4, at 856. See also E. CaAY, supra
note 5, at 209.
86 CAL. PEN. CODE § 2650 (West 1956).
87 Id.
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In an attempt to further control the use of force in prisons,
California Penal Code section 2651 provides that a prisoner shall
be subjected only to that punishment which is authorized by the
Director of Corrections and administered under the direction of
the warden. 8  Arguably, this section should have some prominence
in the field of police brutality. However, the cases citing this statute
do not bear out this assumption. 9
California Penal Code sections 673 and 2652 prohibit the use
of cruel, corporal or unusual punishment in any correctional in-
stitution.90 Violation of either of these statutes is a misdemeanor.91
To convict a person under these sections, the prosecution must
prove that the person inflicted "cruel, inhuman or excessive punish-
ment" on a prisoner in violation of his fundamental and basic
rights. 92 As used in these sections the word "cruel" means: Disposed
to give pain to others, willing or pleased to hurt or afflict. 3 How-
ever, the definition of cruel and unusual punishment is a changing
concept "to be judged in light of developing civilization."94 With
this in mind, and in light of the various charges lodged against the
police and their prison counterparts relative to their cruel prac-
tices," one would expect to find numerous cases arising under any
statute dealing with cruel and unusual punishment. But, very few
cases have been decided under these sections.96
88 CAL. PEN. CODE § 2651 (West 1956).
89 Only two cases were found: In re Riddle, 57 Cal. 2d 848, 372 P.2d 304, 22
Cal. Rptr. 472 (1962). In re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 663, 361 P.2d 417, 12 Cal. Rptr.
754 (1961) (question of warden's authority to limit the practice of the Muslim
religion in prison).
90 CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 673, 2652 (West 1956).
91 Id.
92 In re Riddle, 57 Cal. 2d 848, 852, 372 P.2d 304, 306, 22 Cal. Rptr. 472, 474
(1962).
93 People v. McCaughan, 49 Cal. 2d 409, 317 P.2d 974 (1957).
94 Austin v. Harris, 226 F. Supp. 304, 307-08 (W.D. Mo. 1964).
95 A recent Alameda County Grand Jury report, November 7, 1969, which dis-
cusses the various problems relating to the People's Park incident, supra note 7,
"[Ciriticized the 'lack of supervision' of the Alameda County Sheriff's deputies at
Santa Rita Rehabilitation Farm and called for misdemeanor complaints against two
unidentified deputies at the prison farm." San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 8, 1969, at
12, col. 1.
"Demonstrators taken to Santa Rita .. .had complained that they were subjected
to brutality and harassment by their guards." Id. col. 3. For an interesting, though
probably prejudicial account of the events that gave rise to these complaints see
RAMPARTS, Aug., 1969, at 50.
96 People v. McMillan, 45 Cal. App. 2d 821, 825, 114 P.2d 440, 442, (1941)
(held that section 2652 makes unlawful "the use of any corporal punishment . ..
no matter how moderate or reasonable the amount of force used for punishment.").
O'Brien v. Olson, 42 Cal. App. 2d 449, 109 P.2d 8 (1941) (citing section 2652 held
that the use of a rubber hose by a prison guard to suppress a riot or to prevent a
prisoner from injuring a guard or fellow prisoner is not prohibited by this section).
See also In re Riddle, 57 Cal; 2d 848, 372 P.2d 304, 22 Cal. Rptr. 472 (1962) (citing
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Other California statutes, Penal Code sections 147 and 2653,
provide for a fine and removal from office of anyone who is guilty
of "willful inhumanity or oppression towards a prisoner in his
custody."97 For the reasons discussed above, one would expect that
these sections would have some influence on the control of police
brutality. However, only two cases have been found which cited
these sections and neither of them fulfill this expectation.9"
The best remedy that a prisoner has is to file for a writ of
habeas corpus as provided by California Penal Code sections 1473-
1506.11 This remedy is not limited to the procurement of release by
one unlawfully imprisoned. The writ is granted under exceptional
circumstances to review matters that cannot otherwise be reached.10°
The scope of habeas corpus encompasses the protection of the rights
of prisoners while incarcerated.' It has been used to examine
allegations by prisoners that they have been beaten by guards.0 2 To
be entitled to relief by this writ, the petitioner must allege and
prove that cruel and unusual punishment was inflicted upon him
in violation of his fundamental and basic rights." 3 This remedy is
perhaps the most effective remedy available to the prisoner and
is used quite often. 14
Problems of the Prisoner's Remedies
Possibly one reason that cases under the above sections, with
the exception of the habeas corpus provisions, are so rare is the
very nature of a prisoner's confinement. Although a prisoner can
probably file criminal charges against a prison guard, 10 one can
imagine the repercussions that a prisoner might suffer at the hands
of other guards should he choose to do so. To speculate, these
both sections); In re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 665, 361 P.2d 417, 12 Cal. Rlptr. 755(1961) (citing both sections) ; Fernelius v. Pierce, 22 Cal. 2d 226, 138 P.2d 12 (1943)(citing section 2652); Ex parte Brown, 68 Cal. 176, 8 P. 829 (1895) (citing Penal
Code section 681, which is the source of section 2652).
97 CAL. PEN. 'CODE §§ 147, 2653 (West 1956).
98 In re Riddle, 57 Cal. 2d 848, 372 P.2d 304, 22 Cal. Rptr. 472 (1962) ; People
v. Lisenba, 14 Cal. 2d 403, 89 P.2d 39 (1939) (citing Penal Code section 147, which
is the source of section 2653).
9)9 CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1473-506 (West 1956).100 In re Jackson, 61 Cal. 2d 500, 393 P.2d 420, 39 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1964).
101 "The California courts have used the writ not only to test jurisdiction, but
also to protect the fundamental basic rights of prisoners." In re Riddle, 57 Cal. 2d
848, 851, 372 P.2d 304, 305, 22 Cal. Rptr. 472, 473 (1962).102 In re Cathey, 55 Cal. 2d 679, 391 P.2d 426, 12 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1961).
103 In re Riddle, 57 Cal. 2d 848, 372 P.2d 304, 22 Cal. Rptr. 472 (1962).
104 The existence and frequent use of the writ of habeas corpus by prisoners is
indicative of the otherwise remediless nature of imprisonment.105 At least there are no statutes denying the prisoner this right. The federal
courts allow a prisoner to file charges against guards with the United States Attorney.
Dixon v. Maryland, 261 F. Supp. 746 (D. Md. 1966).
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repercussions could very well be a dominant reason for the lack
of suits filed by prisoners. The scarcity of cases can also be at-
tributed, in part, to the special relationship existing between the
district attorney and prison officials which is somewhat analogous
to the relationship between the district attorney and the police.
1
'
Further, judicial disfavor toward intervening on behalf of prisoners
enters into the picture. 1°7
The civil remedy for prisoners is almost meaningless in Cal-
ifornia due to the concept of civil death. 08 California Penal Code
section 2600 provides that any term of imprisonment suspends the
civil rights of the person so incarcerated. 09 Hence, the prisoner
cannot maintain a civil action in a state court during the term of his
imprisonment.110 But, civil death does not prevent a prisoner from
filing a civil action under the Federal Civil Rights Act."'
By application of section 2600 the prisoner is not allowed to
maintain a civil action while imprisoned, but he still has a cause of
action. His imprisonment tolls the running of the statute of limita-
tions, and the cause of action survives the term of incarceration." 2
Therefore, the prisoner can bring an action for injuries arising out
of his imprisonment when he becomes a member of free society.
However, by the time he is able to bring an action, it is often too
late.113 Consequently, during the period of incarceration, the pris-
oner must rely on habeas corpus to protect himself.
106 See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
107 In re Riddle, 57 Cal. 2d 848, 372 P.2d 304, 22 Cal. Rptr. 472, (1962).
"The courts are and should be reluctant to interfere with or to hamper the dis-
cipline and control that must exist in a prison. Petitions containing such charges must
be carefully scrutinized and the facts carefully weighed with the thought in mind
that they are frequently filed by prisoners who are keen and ready, on the slightest
pretext, or none at all, to harass and annoy the prison officials and to weaken their
power and control. These prisoners include many violent and unscrupulous men who
are ever alert to set law and order at defiance within or without the prison walls." Id.
at 852, 372 P.2d at 306, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 474. cf. supra note 47.
108 For an excellent discussion of this concept, see Comment, Public Entity
Immunity from Tort Claims by Prisoners, 19 HAST. L.J. 573 (1968).
"Where conviction is followed by imprisonment, the chances that the potential
plaintiff will be able to prosecute his action are slim indeed. In about one-third of the
jurisdictions the doctrine of civil death suspends the right to sue during the duration
of imprisonment, which usually includes any time spent on parole." Foote, supra note
31, at 507.
109 CAL. PEN. CODE § 2600 (West 1956).
110 McCollum v. Mayfield, 130 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1955). See Foote, supra
note 31, at 507.
111 'McCollum v. Mayfield, 130 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
112 CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 352 (West 1954); Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598
(9th Cir. 1963).
113 "Potential plaintiffs who are in prison, therefore, usually must wait until they
are released to get their tort remedy. In the meantime . . . . [Tihe cause of action
and its supporting evidence may grow stale. .. ." Foote, supra note 31, at 508.
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POLICE DEFENSES
In a suit against a public employee, including a police officer,
the employee is entitled to assert the same defenses as a private
person." 4 Furthermore a police officer may assert that he is duty
bound to keep his prisoner under control and that he used no more
force than was reasonably necessary to fulfill his duty. n1 5
Additionally, California Government Code section 820.2 pro-
vides the basis of the discretionary immunity doctrine.' 6 At a
glance, this section would appear to protect an officer from liability
arising out of his use of unreasonable force. But the doctrine of
discretionary immunity does not automatically apply to protect a
police officer from every: error in judgment." 7 A police officer
cannot invoke the doctrine of discretionary immunity against a
claim that he used unreasonable force in making an arrest. In fact,
the cases consistently hold that the doctrine is not available to him
in such a case and that he is liable for the use of unreasonable
force." 8
Further, Chapter Three of the California Tort Claims Act of
1963 entitled "Police and Correctional Activities" lists six specific
situations where an officer is immune from liability."9 None of
these sections extends immunity to an officer for the use of un-
reasonable force in effecting an arrest, and it has been held that
such an extension cannot be made.'20
California Government Code section 820.4 states that an
officer is not liable for an injury arising from an act or omission
occurring while "exercising due care, in the enforcement of any
law.""- However, the use of unreasonable force could hardly be
deemed an "exercise of due care." So apparently this section can-
114 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820 (West 1966).
115 Bowers, supra note 1, at 603.
116 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 820.2 (West 1966).
117 Scruggs v. Haynes, 252 Cal. App. 2d 656, 60 Cal. Rptr. 355 (1967).
118 Id.; Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 215 Cal. App. 2d 155, 30 Cal. Rptr. 124
(1963); Boyle v. Evans, 14 Cal. App. 2d 472, 58 P.2d 922 (1936). See, Appier v.
Hayes, 51 Cal. App. 2d 111, 124 P.2d 125 (1942).
119 The six situations where an officer is specifically immune from liability are:
Where he fails to provide police protection. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 845 (West 1966).
Where he fails to provide prison, jail or correctional facilities. Id. § 845.2. Where heinterferes with the right of a prisoner to a judicial determination or review of the
legality of the prisoner's confinement. Id. § 845.4. Where he fails to furnish or obtain
medical care for a prisoner. Id. § 845.6. Where he determines whether to parole or re-
lease a prisoner or one escapes from him and injures a third party in so doing. Id.§ 845.8. Where he fails to make an arrest or retain an arrestee in custody. Id. § 846.120 Scruggs v. Haynes, 252 Cal. App. 2d 256, 266, 60 Cal. Rptr. 355, 362 (1967).
121 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820.4 (West 1966).
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not be used in a police officer's defense in a case based on his use
of unreasonable force. The police officer's only defense, therefore, is
that he exercised reasonable force.
FEDERAL PROVISIONS-A GUIDING LIGHT
Generally
As has been noted numerous times above, the existing state
remedies against a police officer for his use of unreasonable force
appear to be generally inadequate and ineffective as a means to
control police brutality. 2 However, some federal provisions tend
to supplement a victim's inadequate state remedies. Normally, an
officer's official activities are privileged and will not form the basis
of a federal suit against him. But, if an officer's actions deprive a
person of a constitutional right, they are not privileged, notwith-
standing state law to the contrary." In some cases police brutality
works a deprivation of a constitutional right. Congress is em-
powered to enforce the provisions of the Constitution against those
who act under authority of state law in such a way as to deprive
one of his constitutional rights. 24 To this end Congress enacted the
Federal Civil Rights Act which provides for both criminal and
civil actions against one who, acting under color of law, deprives a
person of his rights, privileges, or immunities under the Constitu-
tion.125 The civil and criminal provisions of the act are in pari
materia, meaning that they are designed to protect the same
rights.126
The Civil Rights Act creates a cause of action to remedy the
deprivation of constitutional rights. It is directed against persons
who act under color of law. As such, the Act does not impose
122 See text accompanying notes 31-51, 86-104 & 114-21 supra.
123 Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945).
124 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961).
125 The relevant sections are 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1959) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1959).
18 U.S.C. § 242 provides: "Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation or custom wilfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or Dis-
trict to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured or protected
by the Constitution or laws of the United States, . . . shall be fined not more than
one thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if death
results, shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life."
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides: "Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
Constitution or laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
12 Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240, 248 (3d Cir. 1945).
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liability on states, municipal corporations, cities and police depart-
ments because they are not considered to be "persons" within the
meaning of the Act.'27
To find a person guilty of a violation of 18 U.S.C. section 242,
imposing criminal liability, it must be shown that he acted under
authority of law to willfully subject an inhabitant of the United
States to a deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution.,2
The elements required to impose liability under 42 U.S.C. section
1983 vary from the above because this section imposes civil liability.
To prevail under this section the plaintiff must show that the de-fendant's conduct took place under color of state law and that it
subjected the plaintiff to a deprivation of a constitutional right.129
The leading case in this matter is Screws v. United States,'
which held that if an official is vested with the authority to deal with
a given situation, then any action on his part is action "under color
of law."13' This case involved a shocking episode of police activity.
Petitioners, Screws and a deputy, arrested Hall pursuant to a war-
rant. While Hall was handcuffed petitioners beat him with their
fists and a solid bar. The Court found that the petitioners were,
despite an obvious abuse of their authority, acting under color oflaw at the time of the assault.'32 Making an arrest, then, is action
taken "under color of any statute" or "under color of any law."' 3
In Screws the officers were authorized to make the arrest and
to take steps necessary to effect it.'8 4 The Court found that the use
of excessive force to effect the arrest was the petitioners' only un-
authorized act. But, the Court went on to say, unauthorized acts
can be acts taken "under color of law" in situations like the instant
127 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (Municipal corporations and cities
are not persons); Burmeister v. N.Y. Police Dept., 275 F. Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)(Police department is not a person); Williford v. California, 352 F.2d 474, 476 (9th
Cir. 1965) (State is not a person).
128 United States v. Jackson, 235 F.2d 925, 927 (8th Cir. 1956).
129 Marshall v. Sawyer, 301 F.2d 639, 646 (9th Cir. 1962).130 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
131 Id. at 107.
182 "They were officers of the law who made the arrest. By their own admissions
they assaulted Hall in order to protect themselves and to keep their prisoner from
escaping. It was their duty . . . to make the arrest effective. Hence, their conduct
comes within the statute." Id. at 107-08.13 Federal courts are vested with the power and responsibility to define the
phrases "under color of any law" and "under color of any statute." Marshall v.Sawyer, 301 F.2d 639, 646 (9th Cir. 1962). Because of the pan tnateria nature of thetwo sections under discussion, the phrase "under color of any statute," as used in 42U.S.C. § 1983, is construed the same as the phrase "under color of any law" as usedin 18 U.S.C. § 242. Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240, 248 (3d Cir. 1945),
citing Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
134 325 U.S. at 111.
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case. 13 5 One can see that acts "under color of any law" may include,
but are not necessarily limited to, acts that are taken "under authority
of any law." Hence, a misuse of power vested in a person by virtue
of state law and "made possible only because the wrongdoer is
clothed with the authority of state law" is action taken "under
state law."' 6
Because of the "color of law" provisions of 18 U.S.C. section 242
and 42 U.S.C. section 1983 most cases under these sections involve
governmental employees or officers. While many states employ
various doctrines of civil immunity,'37 such state immunity does not
extend to cases arising under the Federal Civil Rights Act.' 38 To
insure uniformity, the matter of immunity from liability under
federal law is left to the federal courts. 9 Clearly, from the wording
of the statutes under discussion, the federal law provides no im-
munity to a person who, acting under color of state law, deprives
another of a constitutional right." ,
Under 18 U.S.C. section 242 one must show that the officer acted
willfully to deprive a person of a constitutional right.' 41 A "willful
act," as used in a criminal statute, means an act done with a bad
purpose.'42 The bad purpose behind an act may be established by
an inference based on the person's malice, the weapons used in the
assault, the character and duration of the assault and the provoca-
tion, if any.143 In the Screws case the Court inferred the existence
of a bad purpose from the petitioners' use of excessive force and
attached criminal liability thereto.1
44
A willful beating, per se, is not a deprivation of a constitutional
right. To work a deprivation of a constitutional right, the beating
must be given with the purpose of depriving the victim of a con-
135 "Acts of officers who undertake to perform their official duties are included
whether they hew to the line of their authority or overstep it. If ...the statute was
designed to embrace only action which the state authorized, the words 'under color
of any law' were hardly apt words to express the idea." Id.
136 United States v. Classic, 313 US. 299, 326 (1940).
187 This immunity has not been abrogated by the Federal Civil Rights Act. Selico
v. Jackson, 201 F. Supp. 475, 478 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
138 Morgan v. Null, 117 F. Supp. 11, 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
139 See Morgan v. Null, 117 F. Supp. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
140 See note 125 supra. In fact, in action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
is a proper action for awarding exemplary or punitive damages. Cf. Hague v. CIO,
101 F.2d 774, 789 (3d Cir. 1939), opinion modified, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). However,
if the state defends in a suit brought under federal law, the question remains as to
whether or not the federal courts will apply state law under the doctrine of Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
141 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101 (1945).
142 United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394 (1933).
148 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107 (1945).
144 Id. at 107.
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stitutional right.145 The aforementioned is required only in an action
under 18 U.S.C. section 242.146 If one acts willfully in defiance of an
announced rule of law, the purpose to deprive is present.'47 The de-fendant need not know the law that he has violated. To this endit has been said that "[h]e who defies a decision interpreting theConstitution knows exactly what he is doing."' 48 From the aboveit appears that a police officer need only have acted willfully toincur liability under this section, because the purpose to deprive aperson of a constitutional right is inferred from a willful defiance
of the law.
The Rights of Prisoners
The rights of a prisoner are given special consideration underfederal law. He remains under the protection of both the dueprocess clause and the Federal Civil Rights Act.'49 The CivilRights Act protects "any citizen of the United States or otherperson within the jurisdiction thereof."'' 1 Because a prisoner is
a person within the jurisdiction of the United States he can assert a
claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983'1' or file complaint under 18U.S.C. section 242.15 This is true notwithstanding any state im-posed civil death statutes. 15 3 Hence, in the federal courts, as opposed
to the California courts, a prisoner can seek redress for civil wrongs
at the time they occur. He does not have to wait until the end ofhis imprisonment to have justice done on his behalf. Of course theprisoner may, in a proper case use the writ of habeas corpus if he
chooses.154
145 Pullen v. United States, 164 F.2d 756, 759 (5th Cir. 1947).146 In an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 one need prove only that the "[Clonduct
complained of was engaged in under color of state law, and that such conduct sub-jected the plaintiff to the deprivation of rights, privileges or immunities secured bythe Constitution 
. . . ." Marshall v. Sawyer, 301 F.2d 639, 646 (9th Cir. 1962).
147 "When they [violators of the Constitution] act willfully . . . they act inopen defiance or reckless disregard of a constitutional requirement which has been
made specific and definite." Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 105 (1945).
148 Id. at 104-05.
149 Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1963) (per curiam) ; United States v. Jackson,
235 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1956).
150 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1959).
151 McCollum v. Mayfield, 130 F. Supp. 112, 116. (N.D. Cal. 1955); Siegel v.
Ragen, 88 F. Supp. 996, 999 (N.D. I1. 1949).
152 "Any such complaint should be sent to the United States District Attorney."
Dixon v. Maryland, 261 F. Supp. 746, 748 (D. Md. 1966).
153 McCollum v. Mayfield, 130 F. Supp. 112 (D.C. Cal. 1955).154 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1959). "In habeas corpus proceedings, the dist-act judge isnot limited to a simple remand or discharge of the prisoner, but he may dispose of theparty as law and justice requires. Even if it be established beyond question that thealleged mistreatment of the prisoner existed and continued until the present time,the right of society to be protected from convicted criminals may well demand that,
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Furthermore, a prisoner has the right to be protected from
lawless violence while in the custody of a United States marshal.
This right is protected by 42 U.S.C. section 1983.1"5 Also, there is sub-
stantial authority to the effect that an infliction of cruel and un-
usual punishment is a violation of a prisoner's due process rights
and a denial of equal protection of the laws.156 So, as one can see, a
prisoner can assert more rights in the federal courts; that is, he has
the right to be protected by the laws, as well as access to the courts
to insure that protection. Unfortunately, however, the federal courts
have shown a judicial disinclination to intervene in matters of in-
ternal discipline in state prisons.
157
CONCLUSION
Police misconduct, when it occurs, is oftentimes the use of
coercive force against members of the community. The community
cannot, in good conscience, let its police mistreat it. Apparently, the
remedies presently available are not adequate to control police
brutality. Consequently, the citizens must depend upon the police to
discipline themselves and control their use of unreasonable force.
The efficacy of this system has been doubted:158 Witness the recent
increase in interest in the concept of police review boards.
Federal law provides certain guidelines that are not now used
even so, the petitioner be remanded to the state authorities with the direction that the
petitioner's rights be respected." Threatt v. North Carolina, 221 F. Supp. 858, 860
(W.D.N.C. 1963).
155 Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
156 7n re Riddle, 57 Cal. 2d 848, 855, 372 P.2d 304, 305, 22 Cal. Rptr. 
472, 473
(1962), and cases cited therein.
157 "Inmates of State penitentiaries should realize that prison officials are vested
with wide discretion in safeguarding prisoners committed to their custody. Discipline
reasonably maintained in State prisons is not under the supervisory discretion of the
federal courts." United States ex rel. Morris v. Radio Station WENR, 209 F.2d 105,
107 (7th Cir. 1953). "The acts of prison officials ...should be upheld if reasonably
necessary to effectuate the purposes of imprisonment." Kelly v. Dowd, Warden, 140
F.2d 81, 91 (7th Cir. 1944). See, United States v. Ragen, Warden, 237 F.2d 953 (7th
Cir. 1956).
158 "[Wlhen it is observed that a considerable group of plainclothesmen and
higher police officials become directly involved in or tolerate those official crimes, the
magnitude of the total problem can be viewed only as profoundly serious. Moreover,
the evidence indicates that there has been little sustained effort to control it. Indeed,
the methods of disciplining police misconduct that are ordinarily employed appear to
be intrinsically futile." P. TAPPAN, supra note 2, at 308.
"The attitude of supervising officers who might put an abrupt halt to this private
punishment remains as complaisant [sic] as it was twenty-five years ago." E. CRAY,
supra note 5, at 142.
Furthermore, it should be noted that no matter how effective internal discipline
might be, the citizen is not directly benefitted by it because it is "not designed to pro-
vide the aggrieved citizen with any measure of redress." Id. at 201.
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in California. Perhaps these should be looked into and considered
as a means to control police brutality. Because courts are, in mostinstances, the sole form of redress available to the citizen, they must
take a more active role in the area of police brutality. Hopefully the
recent increase in interest in certain police activities evidenced by
the courts, particularly in search and seizure problems, will rub
off in the area of police brutality.
It is imperative that the courts become active in this area.America is nearing a very delicate balancing point between thelegally oriented and the not so legally oriented factions of society.
Adequate law enforcement is needed to stabilize this polarization
before it pulls the country apart. But law enforcement is needed onboth sides of the fence. And, only just law enforcement will serve
this country. The limits of lawful enforcement must be set in ac-
cordance with today's values. The courts must play an active partin this revision as they are one of a small number of bodies that cando so lawfully. Inaction on the courts' part in this matter could tip
the scales the wrong way.
James W. Mullally
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